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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of multimarket contact on
the behavior of pharmaceutical firms controlling for different levels of regulatory
constraints using IMS MIDAS database. Theoretically, firms that meet in several
markets are expected to be capable of sustaining implicitly more profitable out-
comes, even if perfect monitoring is not possible. Firms may find it profitable
to redistribute their market power among markets where they are operating. We
present evidence for nine OECD countries with different degrees of regulation and
show that regulation affects the importance of economic forces on firms’ price set-
ting behavior. Furthermore, our results confirms the presence of the predictions of
the multimarket theory for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and
less regulated ones (U.K., Germany, Netherlands), in contrast, for highly regulated
countries (Japan, France, Italy and Spain) the results are less clear with some coun-
tries being consistent with the theory while others contradicting it.
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1 Introduction
Scott (1982) expressed the general concerns about the adverse effects of multimarket
contacts over competition and welfare in the following way:
Multimarket grouping of sellers could reduce the flow of resources, thereby in-
hibiting a socially desirable competitive process, if it proceeded until mutual
dependence among diversified sellers was recognized and reduction in competi-
tion coordinated, tacitly or otherwise. Scott (1982, p.368)
Although he refers to the specific case of diversifying firms Scott (1982) builds on the old
hypothesis of the existence of “spheres of influence” by Edwards (1955). This observa-
tion proposed that firms that meet each other in several markets may have incentives to
relax competition because they will recognize the interest of its rivals on some markets
(their spheres of influence) and they will respect them in the expectation that their own
interests will also remain unaffected. Although some relevant works in the early eighties
(c.f. Karnani and Wernerfelt (1985)) have also expand on this hypothesis, the article by
Bernheim and Whinston (1990) was the first attempt to formalize the expected effects of
multimarket contacts and review the traditional approach from a dynamic game theoret-
ical framework. The setting of their theoretical exercise is that of a repeated competition
game with discounting where firms meet in an infinite horizon. They show that under the
existence of appropriate conditions, preeminently differences between markets or differ-
ences among firms, contacts among firms across independent markets increases the set of
sustainable collusive equilibria. The incentive mechanism for this result is based on the
strategic assumption that firms will prevent each other from competing more aggressively
in one market because of the fear of triggering retaliation from rivals in the rest of markets
where they meet. The additional assumption for this result is that market transparency
is such that any deviation from the collusive equilibrium is easily detected. Bernheim and
Whinston (1990) show that this traditional view is better supported by the redistribution
of slackness of collective market power in some markets to other markets where collusion
is difficult or not possible to sustain in isolation, i.e. not considering the multimarket na-
ture of the industry. This result states that firms may strategically give up profits -reduce
prices- in markets where collusion is easier to sustain1 in favor of markets where collusion
is difficult or less likely to arise, i.e. where it is expected a tougher price competition. In
short, the prediction of this strategic effect is that under multimarket contact prices will
be higher in markets were it is more difficult to sustain a tacit collusion equilibrium and
lower in markets where it is easier to collude, than those prices expected in the absence
of multimarket contact.
More recent theoretical developments on the analysis of multimarket contact includes
Spagnolo (1999), who shows that the traditional effect of multimarket contact does not
require asymmetries across markets or firms but the concavity of the objective function
of the firms, and the article by Matsushima (2001), in which it is shown that multimarket
contact may reduce the adverse effects for collusion derived from imperfect monitoring of
1Ease of collusion depends on a number of factors such as the number of firms operating in the market,
product homogeneity, speed of interaction, cost asymmetries, demand stability, etc.
1 INTRODUCTION 3
rivals’ actions (lack of transparency of markets). In general these new advances on the
theory of multimarket contacts confirm the importance of this structural characteristic in
shaping collusive equilibria and reinforce the call for testing and understanding it.
Taking Bernheim and Whinston (1990) as a starting point a number of empirical works
have intended to test empirically the predictions of the multimarket theory from different
perspectives. For instance, Evans and Kessides (1994) examine empirically the effects of
multimarket contact on pricing in the U.S. airline industry, finding statistically signifi-
cant and sizeable multimarket effects over the ability of firms to sustain higher fares 2.
Similarly, Jans and Rosembaum (1996) and Parker and Roller (1997) estimate structural
models of firms’ behavior in the cement and the mobile telephone industry respectively and
find that multimarket contact significantly increases collusion. The former also shows that
to identify the market power distribution effect it is crucial to account for the non-home
markets’ concentration. The latter takes advantage of the regulatory change observed
in the cellular industry where former monopolies where replaced by duopolies allowing
the authors to test the validity of the model. They show that multimarket contact can
explain divergence of prices from the marginal costs. Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın (1998) pro-
vide empirical evidence from the Spanish hotel industry supporting the predictions of the
redistribution of market power, putting forward a particular specification to account for
ease of collusion in a single market. Likewise, Pilloff (1999) results on the multimarket
effect in the U.S. banking although relevant for a small number of firms confirms the
importance of this structural feature in shaping economic performance.
In a somehow innovative way, Busse (2000) gives a step further by arguing that mu-
timarket contact may foster specific mechanisms of price coordination. It is tested for
the U.S. cellular industry whether multimarket contact is significant in explaining price
parallelism by firms across independent market as a device for facilitating collusion. The
results suggest that multimarket contact help to sustain prices by means of facilitating
the parallelism mechanism by which one firm parallels its pricing in one market to that
of other linked by multimarket contact.
The present work provides an empirical implementation of the multimarket theory for
the pharmaceutical industry for nine OECD countries. Given the existing institutional
differences in the pharmaceutical markets across countries the objective of this paper is to
test the theory in the context of price regulation variation. As an extension of the results,
we aim at evaluating empirically how more or less stringent price regulations is likely to
affect pricing decisions through the multimarket mechanism. As mentioned in Puig-Junoy
(2005), arguments regarding classic market imperfections in the pharmaceutical industry
have been used to sustain drug price controls., however the main concern is the level of
public expenditures in pharmaceutical products, specially for systems financed through
public sources as is the case of most EU experiences [See commments in Danzon (1999)]3.
2Evans and Kessides (1994) reported the term “living by the golden rule” to picture the mechanism
of mutual forbearance.
3These concerns are also related to the well known aging of Western European population that has
been challenging the public health care systems’ sustainability
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Thus, many different types of price regulations and other policies have been put forward
by developed countries, and EU countries in particular, to alleviate the price incidence
over public health expenditures. Price regulations usually do not pay attention to the ex-
ternal features that may be affecting players’ decision in a regulated market. By external
elements we mean interactions of players out of the market of reference but in the same
industry. In the pharmaceutical industry at a national level, an important feature is the
coexistence of many corporations in different products markets or business/product lines.
Consequently, the relevant question is to investigate whether strategic behavior driven by
multimarket contacts is affected by the level of price regulation. Obviously it is also of
relevance to understand and test how price regulation conditions pricing decision in the
light of the multimarket contact nature of the industry.
In the context of different regulatory regimes, Danzon and Chao (2000) identify different
groups of countries depending on the severity of regulation. From more to less regulated,
the first group includes Italy, France and Japan were launch prices are regulated and
afterwards are revised downwards over the drug’s life cycle, and the price of new varieties
is related to the price of established varieties. In addition, generic substitution by phar-
macists is not allowed in France and Italy. Moreover, in the latter countries, pharmacies
are paid a margin on the product price which may encourage them to sell more expensive
products. The second group includes UK and Germany were corporations are free to
set prices at launch but prices cannot increase later on. In addition, in both countries
there is some type of upper bound to prices, implemented either through a Reference
Price (Germany) or a maximum overall rate of return (UK). Consumer demand substitu-
tion is partially possible only in Germany because of the possibility of multisource drugs.
Generic substitution by pharmacists is the main source of price-demand elasticity since
they keep the margin between the reimbursement price and the manufacturers price. This
is possible in UK, and to a lesser extent in Germany. The third group includes US and
Canada where prices are free, consumers’ and physicians’ demands appear to be less in-
elastic and generic substitution on the side of the pharmacists is encouraged as a mean to
promote competition. Danzon and Furukawa (2003) indicates that in the US the existing
type of regulation is in fact a mild Reference Price; in any case this country is taken as a
benchmark for competition analysis.
Danzon and Chao (2000) estimate reduced form equations for prices on quality attributes
and competition characteristics. According to their expectation, the competition vari-
ables should be significant only in less regulated markets. The empirical results suggests
that regulation constraints competition. The main goal of our work can be seen as an
extension of this type of analysis to account for the effects of multimarket contact on
competition in order to identify additional effects of regulation on competition.4
Apart from the institutional constraints for business practices, the industry presents sev-
eral particular characteristics that are worth noting. Previous evidence in this industry
4Danzon and Furukawa (2004) suggest that fixed costs are distributed across countries depending
on demand elasticities, so that higher prices happen to be in richer countries. This suggest that in a
cross-country study specific country measures should also be included in the regression.
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suggest that marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry and recommend the use
of a hedonic price approach5. In particular, Berndt et al. (1999) estimate a hedonic price
equation that measures the price impact of drugs attributes such as adverse interactions
(number of major drugs with which our drug had adverse interactions), the number of side
effects, dosage (number of tablets per day required to attain the recommended daily con-
sumption of the active ingredient), number of indications, etc.6 Likewise, in the context of
an entry model, Frank and Salkever (1997) include past sales reflecting learning or word of
mouth effects but it could also measure if entry by generics is more or less attractive (this
variable is treated as an additional attribute that proxies perceived quality by consumers).
Several authors have also accounted for perceived quality when modeling the pharma-
ceutical industry, particularly from the likely (static) effects of advertising and promotion
over exacerbated price insensitiveness. In particular, King (2000) and Windmeijer et al.
(2004) conclude that brand advertising and promotion further reduces price sensitiveness
of drugs. In a somehow related work, Coscelli (2000) suggests that drug consumption
exhibits time dependence which implies additional price insensitiveness due to what can
be understood as brand loyalty.
With respect to the effects of entry of generic products on price evolution, the empir-
ical evidence is ambiguous. After entry of generic products, some authors (Grabowski
and Vernon, 1992 and 1997, and Caves, Whinston Hurwitz, Pakes and Termin, 1991)
report that brand-name prices increased relative to generic prices, while others (Wiggins
and Maness, 1994) find a reduction in prices following entry. Finally, Frank and Salkever
(1992 and 1997) report that brand name prices increased while generic products prices
fell, producing a reduction in average prices. The latter explain the correlation between
brand name prices and generics’ entry through a Stakelberg price leader model, where
brand name producers set prices for their products in the first stage and generic product
producers set prices only after observing brand name product prices. Demand is formed
by two segments: one is price insensitive and the second is price responsive. After the
entry of generics price responsive buyers shift to generics and brand name firms, who are
left with price insensitive consumers decide to raise their prices 7. We will differentiate
the effect of generic prices over the pricing decisions of firms considering that brand-name
drugs belong to a particular (though not independent) segment of the market.
In sum, we believe the pharmaceutical industry accounts for many interesting aspects
5This is the treatment given by Stern (1996) for example and also implicitly assumed in Danzon and
Chao (2000)
6Berndt et al. (1996), Cockburn and Anis (1998) and Suslow (1996) followed a similar approach.
7However, this mixed evidence could also be interpreted in the context of more traditional models of
competition were we take into account the existence of multimarket contact and the interaction between
brand name and generic products markets. For instance, assume that ease of collusion was lower (for
whatever reason) in the brand name market while it is higher in the generic products market (for instance,
because of cost and brand image symmetry, that would make competition very tough in the absence of
some degree of tacit collusion). Now, in the presence of multimarket contact, if the same firms operate
in both markets, the emergence of the generic products market could induce an increase in brand-name
product prices, while being consistent with a lower average price in the market.
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such as different levels of regulation across countries, product differentiation possibly
both at the horizontal and quality levels, different degrees of competition across markets
and other institutional arrangements that affects price sensibility. Differences in compet-
itive levels across markets according to Bernheim and Whinston (1990) may foster the
collusive mechanism through multimarket contact. At the same time, differences among
firms and across markets in terms of the perceived quality of the product by doctors, for
instance, are also likely to enhance the multimarket contact mechanism to sustain collu-
sion. Therefore, it appears that this industry satisfy the conditions for a relevant study
of the effects of the external (to the individual market) multimarket industry structures
as a source of price variation.
The theoretical results about competition and multimarket contact can lead to several
types of tests and applications in the context of the pharmaceutical markets. As Evans
and Kessides (1994) suggest: ’In empirical tests of the multimarket contact hypotheses,
appropriate definition of the market is of paramount importance.’ Pharmaceutical markets
are usually bounded in terms of therapeutic classes of drugs, the members of which often
are therapeutic substitutes, e.g., antiulcer drugs, antidepressants, anticholesterol drugs.
etc.8 In addition, within each therapeutic class we find a large number of countries which
might be regarded as independent markets on the demand side because of differences
in their regulatory systems and various barriers to the mobility of drugs. Then from a
geographical point of view, markets might be defined as countries and within countries a
market is to be regarded either as a product line or a grouping of related product lines.
We motivate the empirical exercise by showing that it is possible to formulate, within
a model with (symmetric) product differentiation, an expression for the observed prices
as the equilibrium strategies of an infinite horizon game with discounting which has three
separable parts: First, a function for the stage game price in equilibrium, Second, a func-
tion of the multimarket external conditions, and a function of the time preference. This
formulation is comparable to that followed in Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın (1998). For the em-
pirical test of multimarket contact effects, we use a multicountry and multiproduct data
set from the IMS MIDAS international dataset for the period 1998-2003. This dataset en-
compasses a large number of countries including the top seven in terms of pharmaceutical
expenditures, as well as medium size and small countries. It also includes a large number
of groups or anatomic classifications, and allows to study between countries variations,
specially in terms of both regulatory regimes and industry structure. Provided with this
data set, we select a sample of nine OECD countries, namely U.S., Canada, U.K., Nether-
lands, Germany, France, Japan, Italy and Spain that differ mainly in the toughness of
pricing regulations but other institutional arrangements are comparable such as the com-
pulsory need of a prescription for drug delivery. We estimate the effect of multimarket
contact on prices using panel data methods which also helps us to control for a variety
of effects such as idiosyncratic corporation effects and where the case requires country
specific fixed effects.
8See Berndt et al. (1995)
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Our preliminary results confirms the presence of the predictions of the multimarket the-
ory for more market friendly countries (U.S. and Canada) and less regulated ones (U.K.,
Germany, Netherlands), in contrast, for highly regulated countries (Japan, France, Italy
and Spain) the results are less clear with some countries being consistent with the theory
while others contradicting it. Interestingly in all the cases where the theory seems at least
weakly consistent if we omit the market power distribution effect from more collusive sin-
gle markets to more competitive ones, our multimarket variable appears to deliver biased
estimates. Therefore, our data and results suggests that in the pharmaceutical industry
the distribution of market power is a relevant feature to explain economic performance.
We expand further the analysis by conjecturing that given the observation that price reg-
ulations tend to decrease or limit competition (e.g. Danzon and Chao (2000)), the size
effect of the distribution of market power should be bigger in regulated countries than in
less regulated ones. This conjecture seems to be sustained by the results meaning that
(price) regulation not only limits competition in a single market but also helps to relax
competition in plausibly more competitive ones by the multimarket contact mechanism
in this industry. The relevance of additional analysis of these findings is uncontroversial,
for instance cross industry studies as well as individual industry investigations.
The paper proceeds as follows: After this introduction we present in section 2 the
theoretical implications of multimarket contacts and show how observed prices can be
approached from this framework; section 3 describes the data set and the variables to
be used; next, section 4 presents the empirical specification based on the suggestions
of section 2 and also discusses the econometric methods, identification problems and
solutions; finally, section 5 describes the results and their interpretations as well as some
robustness exercises.
2 Discussion on the implications of multimarket con-
tact
It is a well known result that firms could achieve more collusive outcomes when they expect
to meet and compete for an infinite number of periods. To achieve these outcomes, the
firms involved must design a set of credible penalties for deviating players. For instance,
if a firm decides to deviate from the collusive outcome, the penalty imposed could consist
of reverting for the remainder of the game to the equilibrium strategy for the stage game,
since this is also a subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated game. In what follows
we present the implications of the multimarket contact theory and a discussion of the
possible effects of regulations over the collusive mechanism it disentangles.
2.1 Observed prices from a multimarket perspective
To simplify the analysis, assume a market k where Nk firms producing symmetrically
differentiated products compete in prices and denote the equilibrium prices in the one
shot game by p∗i , i = 1, ..., Nk. Consider this as the stage game of an infinitely repeated
game with discounting. Let pmi denote the price that jointly maximizes the profits of all
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the Nk firms in the market
9. Now firms have the possibility of choosing from a set of
alternative prices in the repeated game and tacitly support prices above the stage game
outcome in the long run. Detection of any deviation from this collusive outcome will be
penalized by all the members of the coalition by reverting to the stage game equilibrium
from then on. This also implies that market transparency is such that rivals can easily find
out whether a member of the coalition has defected or not, an assumption that has been
criticized from many instances in the literature 10. Denote by p
′
i the price for firm i in the
repeated game and assume that p
′
i ∈ [p∗i , pmi ]. p′i then is selected such that it maximizes
the present discounted value of the firm’s expected flow of profits subject to the incentive
constraint that loses implied by deviations from the collusive path are greater than the
implied gains 11:
δ
1− δ [pi
′
i − pi∗i ] ≥ pii(Ri(p
′
−i), p
′
−i)− pi
′
i (1)
where pi∗i and pi
′
i are firm i’s profits when prices are p
∗
i and p
′
i respectively, pii(Ri(p
′
−i), p
′
−i)
are firm i’s profits when all firms other that i set their collusive prices, p
′
−i, and firm i
chooses its best response to them, Ri(p
′
−i), and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. Now,
note that if pmi is to be supported as a sub game perfect equilibrium, then it must be the
case that there is no profitable deviation from it, in other words it satisfies:
δ
1− δ [pi
m
i − pi∗i ] ≥ pii(Ri(pm−i), pm−i)− pimi (2)
Where pimi is firm’s i profits from the joint profit maximization outcome. While the left
hand side of this expression depends on δ, and increases monotonically in this argument,
the right hand side is independent of the discount factor. If we denote the left hand side
by F (δ, pimi − pi∗i ) the following condition is true:
F (0, pimi − pi∗i ) < pii(Ri(pm−i), pm−i)− pimi < F (1, pimi − pi∗i ) (3)
This expression implies the existence of some threshold for the discount factor, say δm,
above which the joint profit maximization outcome is a sub game perfect equilibrium.
Although other strategies may be supported in equilibrium by values above δm, we shall
assume that firms will select the highest price pimi . Below δ
m, pmi cannot be supported
and the maximum sustainable price is given by p+i (δ). Lets define the maximum sus-
tainable price as a function of the discount factor by p+i (δ) = max{pi ∈ [p∗i , pmi ) |
F (δ, pii − pi∗i ) ≥ pii(Ri(p−i), p−i) − pii)}. Note that the condition in this function when
9With symmetric product differentiation it is expected that joint profit maximization give also a
symmetric price equilibrium. See Bernheim and Whinston (1990) and Chang (1991)
10For example a sudden reduction on a firm’s sales may be an indication that one or more rivals have
defected or can be just the result of a random demand shock which implies that perfect monitoring of
rivals’ decisions is not possible
11More precisely, in a symmetric product differentiation set up p
′
i is the price that maximizes joint
profits under the constraint that loses from deviations are greater or equal than the gains from such an
strategy.
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p+i = p
∗
i implies F (δ, 0) = pii(Ri(p−i), p
∗
−i) − pi∗i ) = 0 and when p+i → pmi implies
F (δ, pmi ) < pii(Ri(p−i), p
m
−i) − pimi ); therefore if p+i (δ) > p∗i it should be the case that
the condition is hold with equality. To proceed with the analysis we need to make some
monotonicity assumption on this function. Furthermore in the context of product het-
erogeneity, the way in which the discount factor affects the maximum sustainable price
depends on the nature of product differentiation. For instance, Chang (1991) showed that
in the context of symmetric horizontal product differentiation the maximum sustainable
price, also known as best collusive price, has the property that ∂p+i /∂δ > 0 while in the
case of vertical (quality) product differentiation explored by Ha¨ckner (1994) there is not
a clear answer. However, it is possible to show in the context of Hackner’s analysis that
given a level of (non symmetric) product differentiation, the price of the high quality
firm that maximizes joint profits is increasing in the discount factor. For our analysis
we will adopt the plausible property that p+i (δ) is a monotonically increasing function.
This implies the intuitive result that whenever future profits are more valuable, short run
benefits from defecting are accordingly less preferred. Therefore p
′
i, the collusive price,
will be a non-decreasing function of δ.
At any given δ, p
′
i will depend on the same cost and demand conditions that deter-
mine p∗i . This last fact together with assumption that p
′
i ∈ [p∗i , pmi ] and the discussion
above allows us to express p
′
i as a separable function of the equilibrium price in the stage
game and a function of the discount factor, p
′
i = Φ(δ) p
∗
i , where:
Φ(δ) =

pmi
p∗i
if δ > δm
p+i (δ)
p∗i
if δm > δ
Note that for sufficiently low δ (< δm) the most collusive outcome requires p+i = p
∗
i which
readily implies Φ(δ) = 1. From there this function increases until it reaches the upper
bound
pmi
p∗i
. Once this simple analysis is expanded to allow for the realistic situation in
which firms interact with their rivals in many independent markets, some interesting hy-
potheses on the expected strategic behavior of firms may be extracted.
To model the implications of multimarket contacts it is reasonably assumed that any
firm which intends to deviate from the collusive equilibrium in any market k will face a
penalty in every of the markets where it meets its market k rivals. Given that the pun-
ishment is going to spread over all the markets, when a firm decides to deviate from the
collusive strategy it does so simultaneously in all the markets where it operates. There-
fore, assuming that firm i is present in K independent markets, the incentive constraint
under the multimarket contact hypothesis becomes:
K∑
k=1
δk
1− δk [pi
′
ik − pi∗ik] ≥
K∑
k=1
{
piik(Rik(p
′
−ik), p
′
−ik) + pi
′
ik
}
(4)
This condition is a pooling of the K individual market incentive constraints. From this
expression Bernheim and Whinston (1990) derive several interesting results. First, for
identical markets and firms’ characteristics across markets, both profits and losses from
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deviating are multiplied by the number of markets where the firms are meeting, and the
set of strategies that form subgame perfect equilibria remains unchanged. 12.
Second, when markets differ, for example by different degrees of symmetric product dif-
ferentiation, or firms have market specific characteristics (have different quality premiums
for instance), we can obtain a larger set of sustainable equilibria for each market that still
includes all the equilibrium strategies available in the absence of multimarket contact. In
particular, a firm can reach more collusive outcomes in some markets by violating condi-
tion (1) as long as this condition holds in other markets as a strict inequality, i.e., when
p
′
ik = p
m
ik for some k, and condition (2) holds for the whole set of markets where the firm
operates.
Third, and more interestingly, firms can go further than what is implied by the last
possibility. Imagine a situation in which condition (1) holds as an equality for all the
markets where the firm is operating, i.e. p
′
ik = p
+
ik for all k ∈ K. In this case, firms can
reduce their price in a sub set of markets so that condition (1) in these markets holds now
as a strict inequality. In this way firms create some slackness in a number of markets so
that they can increase prices in some (or all) of the rest of the markets, violating condi-
tion (1), as long as condition (2) still holds. Along this line of argumentation, Bernheim
and Whinston (1990) conclude that firms can find it optimal to redistribute their market
power, giving up profits in some markets where the collective action is easier to coordi-
nate in order to increase profits in other markets where the toughness of price competition
precludes a more collusive result. Given the link between ease of collusion and demand
responsiveness, the expected outcome of this strategy is a positive net gain for the firm.
Assuming as given the structure of each k market and as a consequence the structure
of multimarket contacts for firm i, we can represent the firm’s equilibrium price of the
repeated game in market k as a function of three separable components:
p
′
ik = Γ(MMCik, θk) Φ(δk) p
∗
ik (5)
where Γ(MMCik, θk) > 0 measures the effect of the multimarket contacts structure given
by variable MMCik and some measure of the toughness of price competition at the stage
game in market k, which we denoted θk. In terms of the hypothesis of the strategic
behavior supported by the existence of multimarket contacts, the key prediction implies
that ∂
2Γ(.)
∂MMCik∂θk
> 0. That is, the strategic effect of multimarket contact over the repeated
game equilibrium price is expected to be increasing in the toughness of price competition.
More precisely, it is expected to observe Γ(MMCjik) < 1 in markets where a collusive price
is easier to support (less toughness of price competition) in equilibrium and Γ(MMCjik)
> 1 in markets with less favorable conditions to sustain collusion.
12This is labeled as the irrelevance result by the authors. Spagnolo (1999), however, has shown that
when the objective function of the agent is strictly concave then multimarket contact can increase the
ability of firms to support collusion even if no asymmetries exist between markets
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2.2 Effects of regulation on strategic behavior
There are many types of regulations within the pharmaceutical industry across countries
and even in a particular country many kinds of controls coexist. However, we are inter-
ested on policies aim at promoting competition between brand-name drugs and generic
substitutes and in opposition direct price ceilings. The former are supposed to relax the
price elasticity of demand, and usually this type of regulations take the form of reference
price systems. On the other hand, direct price controls and the impediment to increase
prices once the ceiling has been adopted are considered to be counterproductive.
Although we do not present a formal discussion on the likely effects of regulation, in
particular price ceilings for drug products, the literature on the topic gives us some initial
thoughts about the kinds of distortions that may affect the strategic behavior of firms in
this industry. Cabrales (2003) provides a theoretical approach to the effects of price ceil-
ings in the pharmaceutical industry using a vertical differentiation oligopolistic model. He
is able to show that increasing the stringiness of regulation increases the relative market
share of the branded product with respect to generic drugs, a result that is compatible
with what is informally observed in practice. 13
From an empirical perspective, Aronson et al. (2001) studies the effect of reference price
systems over well established brand name drugs. The results are mixed, showing a pos-
itive relation between price controls and brand name product market shares for some
products and a negative one for others. Likewise, Danzon and Chao (2000) have found
that countries where price regulations are more strict, such as France, Italy and Japan,
price competition is less dynamic and tough. One interpretation of the latter result would
be that regulation is helping collusion and so the full gains of price controls are not been
realized.
The above mentioned studies will at least weakly suggest that price reference systems and
more importantly price caps increase relatively the market power by increasing the share
of brand name products in some particular markets. Therefore, it could be conjectured
that price cap regulation, and to a less extent reference pricing, moves the distribution of
the concentration index towards 1 in more regulated industries. However the mechanisms
for this result are interesting we want to focus in the likely result of this in practice from
our perspective. If price regulation induces such a move in the concentration distribution
it will tend to increase asymmetric concentration in general regulated industries. There-
fore, the strategic effect of multimarket contacts may be influenced by more stringent price
controls. Hence we will formally expect that the size of the market power re-distribution
to be affected. A conjecture will be then that price regulation, and preeminently price
caps, may increase the size of the re-distribution mechanism by creating some (additional)
slack in markets where prices are higher either by reducing the prices or increasing the
concentration and potentially relaxing competition.
13This model also reproduces the so called generic price paradox briefly described lines above.
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3 Data and construction of the variables
3.1 Data set description and analysis
We use a multicountry and multiproduct data set from the IMS MIDAS international
dataset for the period 1998-200314. This dataset encompasses a large number of countries
including the top seven in terms of medicine expenditures, as well as medium size and
small countries(see Table 1 for a list of countries and data summary). The most widely
used classification for pharmaceutical products is the Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
classification or ATC code which groups medicines in different levels starting from the
basic chemical entity or molecule at the bottom level. This classification provides the
researcher an a priori way to approach the study of markets for drugs with the possibility
of using many alternative relevant market definitions 15. The panel structure of the data
set also provides the econometrician with several sources of price variations that can be
studied. This is particularly interesting for our work given that market structure and the
configuration of multimarket contacts will vary across product markets, whatever their
definition, and time.
As in any applied industrial organization and competition analysis, a correct market de-
finition is crucial. The pharmaceutical industry represents, however, a complex exercise
of market definition considering that shaping geographical boundaries within a country
or clear mutually exclusive sets of substitute products is not straightforward. We disre-
gard any delimitation of regional markets within a country, as it is reasonably to assume
that value to cost transportation in this industry is high. In the ATC classification, the
basic unit of differentiation between two products is the main chemical substance of the
products, called the molecule. When two products have the same chemical substance
are thought to be therapeutically equivalent. When they belong to different molecules
they can be imperfect substitutes for a therapy or have no relation at all. In the current
study we define a market as the set of products whose main chemical composite belongs
to the same molecule. However, this definition may be too narrow based on the well
known fact that different molecules can be used to treat the same medical condition. We
then contrast the results with a broader definition of the market: the 4-digits Anatomic
Therapeutical Classification (ATC4) the molecule belongs in. Table 1 (panel B) presents
the distribution of corporations depending on the number of markets supplied for the set
of countries considered in our sample, namely: US, Canada, Germany, UK, Netherlands,
France, Italy, Japan, and Spain.
This data set is specially valuable to conduct a cross country study which is of par-
ticular interest for the industry due to the different regulatory regimes each country have
designed and currently applies. Following the comprehensive study by Danzon and Chao
14We dispose of information from the 4th quarter of each year, apart from 2003, for which the infor-
mation is provided for the 2nd quarter.
15The ATC classification is supported and maintained by the World Health Organization Collaborating
Centre for Drug Statistics Methodology with a base in the Norwegian Institute of Public Health
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(2000) as well as the advice of recognized experts16 we group the countries considered in
the sample in three regulatory categories. (I) US and Canada belong to the group of more
market friendly policies; (II) Germany, UK, Netherlands belong to the group of medium
regulated; and, finally, (III) France, Italy, Japan, and Spain belong the highly regulated
group.
The list of variables that we construct is the following. The variable price, called Price,
corresponds to sales revenue divided by the number of ‘standard units’ sold. As pointed
out by several authors marginal costs are almost irrelevant in the industry [c.f. Stern
(1996)]. This suggests the use of a hedonic approach.17 Accordingly, in our regression we
incorporate this approach and include quality variables as regressors to proxy the stage
game equilibrium price. The quality variables for which we do have information and
therefore we include in our regressions are as follows: The variable firm’s size, Fsize, is
constructed as total corporation sales correcting it by excluding sales of the product under
analysis in each country. Molecule age, Molage, is the time elapsed since the molecule
was launched to December 31, 2003. The age distribution of molecules and products is
presented in table 1 (panel C). Also competition variables related to the mark-up are also
computed. These variables are: Number of generics, ngenerics, is the number of generic
products in each market and country. Given that there is not a clear definition of what a
generic product is [see discussion in Scherer (1993)], we use an economic approach based
on the difference between product produced by a corporation holding a brand reputation
and small producers; the Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl concentration index, HHI, is constructed
using corporation sales value, with squared market shares of the corporation under analy-
sis excluded from the index, HHI-corr. We construct the market share of each variety
in the market, Mshare, and the aggregate market share of all other varieties supplied
by the same corporation in each market, Cshare. For the regression analysis we use log
transformations of Price, Fsize and Molage, so we value more the differences in smaller
than in larger values.
Several dummy variables are also constructed: New is a dummy variable equal to one
if the product was launched in the previous year and zero otherwise, Censormol equals 1
if the variable was launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise, Censorlag equals
one for products launched before January 1, 1991 and zero otherwise. These dummies are
part of the quality variables used to capture price variation.
In addition to these variables, concerns on the endogeneity of some of the regressors led
us to find a way to include some additional information. The argument is that in pharma-
ceutical markets, product differentiation in terms of attributes is of particular relevance.
However many important attributes are not observable for the econometrician because are
not measurable or as it is in our case are absent from our data set. The stage game price
P ∗ik will be a function of marginal costs, usually thought to be irrelevant in the industry,
16We are indebted to Guillem Lo´pez and Vicente Ortu´n from the Center for Health Economics Research
(UPF) and Fe´lix Lobo (UC3M) for helpful advice on this regard.
17See Berndt, Cockburn and Griliches, 1996, Berndt, Pindyck and Azoulay, 1999, Cockburn and Anis,
1998, and Suslow, 1996.
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and a mark-up term. This mark-up will depend on some measures of market participation
such as those commented lines above. However this mark-up variables will be correlated
with unobserved characteristics of the product i whose effect by definition will be located
in the error term. Abusing the language of the Instrumental Variables approach to the
problem, we put forward an identification assumption that the independence of markets
across countries gives us the possibility of using the price of other products in the same
market definition in other countries to control for the unobserved effects. The argument
is that this prices will be correlated with time variable and time invariant unobserved
attributes of a number of products that interact with product i in market k, information
that is also relevant to the firm to set prices. However this attributes of other products
are not correlated with product’s i own characteristics and as such helps as to control for
some of the unknown price variability. The variable constructed is a global price, Gprice,
which is the average price of the products belonging to the same market definition of i
but in other countries.
In addition, and concerned with the same endogeneity problem, firm specific attributes
that are time invariant in the sample such as brand reputation are usually unobserved for
the econometrician and can be correlated with some of the left hand side variables. For
these reason we will used a fixed corporation effect approach in the regression analysis.
Given its relevance for this paper, the definition and construction of variables capturing
the influences of multimarket contact will be discussed in the following sub-section.
3.2 Alternative measures for multimarket contact
In the empirical literature discussed in the introduction, many different ways of defining
multimarket contact have been tried. From a purely strategic point of view, there has
been consensus that a contact of firm i with its rivals in the focal (or reference) market
k in other markets should reflect the importance of this last contact market for the firm.
This is considered in our definitions either by using market shares or concentration in-
dexes in terms of quantities or sales as weights for each market contact. Other important
general consideration is concerned to the extent to which individual price variation is
explained by the firm individual multimarket contacts variation or average multimarket
contact across firms within a given market. The former approach will for instance capture
the effect of small prediction power of multimarket contacts because of the presence of
small firms producing a very limited number of products. In contrast, the latter implies
that average multimarket contacts across firms within a market will affect all the firms in
this markets in the same way, no matter how many individual market contacts have each
firm. We will try both specifications.
With respect to the multimarket contact variable, an instance of multimarket contact
occurs, according to our definition, when a corporation i and its competitor l in the focal
market k, also meet in a different market m that we will call the contact market. If an
event of multimarket contact occurs we define a dummy variable Cil,km = 1, otherwise
Cil,km = 0. We define first individual measures of multimarket contact. The variable,
MMC, is defined:
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MMCil,km = Cil,km Ym
where Y measures the corporations’ interests in the contact market m. We can think
of several instances for Y , such as the degree of concentration, the corporation’s market
share or the percentage of the corporations’ operations in that market. The measure of
multimarket contact is the weighted average number of multimarket contacts with the
competitors in the focal market which is calculated as follows:
AVMMCik =
1
(Nk − 1)
∑
l 6=i
∑
m6=k
MMCil,km (6)
where Nk is the number of competitors in the focal market. An alternative way of
defining the multimarket contact variable is to average across all the weighted contacts of
every firm with its rivals in the focal market using the total number of potential pairings
of the same firms. In this case the multimarket contact variable will vary across markets
but remain fixed within markets. The definition will be given by:
AVMMCk =
1
(Nk(Nk − 1))/2
∑
i
∑
l 6=i
∑
m6=k
MMCil,km (7)
where (Nk(Nk − 1))/2 is the total number of possible pairings of the firms belonging to
market k. This indicator will punish markets where a large number of firms exists in the
focal market but very few interact with each other out of the focal market. Descriptive
statistics for these two definitions as well as respective not weighted versions, that is for
the case Ym = 1, are shown in table 2.
4 Empirical specification and Econometric methods
In section 2 we have shown an expression for the observed price of a product considering
the multimarket structure of the industry. We generalize this expression for the case of a
firm that might be producing more than one product within the same market. Therefore
the price for a product j of firm i in market k, denoted p
′
jik, can be represented as a
separable function of its equilibrium price in the stage game, p∗jik, a mark-up on this price
which depends on the discount factor, δ, and a function of the degree of multimarket
contact and the ease of collusion in both the focal and the contact market. Assuming
linearity we consider the following log-linear specification:
log(p
′
jikt) = α+ Ω(MMCikt, θkt) + Φ(δi) + log(p
∗
jikt) (8)
where t denotes time, Ω(MMCikt, θk) = log Γ(MMCikt(θkt)), and α is a parameter. Note
that the multimarket contact indicator varies across firms within a given market. In the
related literature this variable is considered fixed within markets in most of the cases. This
approach is based on the assumption that the complete set of multimarket contacts within
a market will affect the pricing decisions of all the firms in the same amount. However we
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may think of small firms within a market for which multimarket contact does not explains
too much variation on prices. This is the case of the pharmaceutical markets where large
corporations share a given market with small (possibly local) producers. Allowing for a
multimarket contact indicator that varies across firms helps us to factor in possible effects
of the presence of local firms, in particular over the ability of firms to coordinate. The
log of the stage game equilibrium price is specified as:
log(p∗jikt) = X
1′
jiktβ1 +X
2′
jikβ2 + Z
1′
ktγ1 + Z
2′
k γ2 + η1i + vjikt (9)
where the Xs and Zs are vectors of respectively time-variant and time-invariant variables
concerning product j of firm i on one hand, and market k on the other, that poten-
tially affect the stage game equilibrium prices through different meaningful ways, β, and
γ are the corresponding parameter vectors, η1i is a firm fixed effect and vjikt contains
unobserved elements for the econometrician. Given the product differentiation nature of
pharmaceutical markets we can interpret the pricing equation as a function of variables
affecting marginal costs (which are usually thought to be negligible in this industry) and
the product’s mark-up such as observed attributes that are fixed or vary through time.
From a structural point of view these attributes will affect the firm’s and specific product
market shares. At the same time, the fixed effect is included to control for elements of
vertical (quality) product differentiation which are one of the most highlighted peculiar-
ities of this industry. The vjikt can be regarded as that information on attributes that
are not observed by the econometrician but firm’s do take into account when taking their
pricing decisions. To complete the specification, we use the following expression for the
discount factor function:
Φ(δjikct) = η2i + λt (10)
That is, taking advantage of the panel structure of the data, we proxy the discount factor
by an specific firm effect ηi, and λt, a time specific factor. After replacing these expressions
in the above equation we obtain:
log(p
′
jikt) = α+Ω(MMCikt, θk) +X
1′
jiktβ1 +X
2′
jikβ2 +Z
1′
ktγ1 +Z
2′
k γ2 + ηi + λt + vjikt (11)
Note that we have collapsed the two firm specific time invariant effects of the two previous
expressions (η1i and η2i) respectively) in ηi.
In some of the related works reviewed [e.g. Evans and Kessides (1994)] there is some im-
portant industry specific features that call for controlling for market fixed effects which are
absent in our specification. The need for including market effects should be supported by
relevant structural characteristics. For example, in the airline industry, a market defined
as a route has important structural characteristics such as market specific fixed costs. In
our case we are in fact identifying the effects of important time-invariant product and
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market features in the industry through the inclusion of the X2jik and Z
2
k vectors respec-
tively.
We estimate equation (11) country by country using a Within Groups panel data method,
where the firms’ specific heterogeneity effect νi are accounted for. Some of the left hand
side variables are potentially endogenous, mainly because they can be directly influenced
by unobserved attributes of the product in the stage game price equations. For instance,
as we will see in the next sub-section, different market shares definitions are incorporated
as regressors. For these reason we adopt the identifying assumption that product markets
are independent across time and countries and the global price variable is used so as to
control for time varying unobserved features. In addition we use the panel data structure
of the data and variables that are thought to be endogenous to the disturbances are lagged
one period in an attempt to further avoid inconsistent estimators.
4.1 Variables and multimarket contact definition
To sum up, the different groups of variables included in the panel data regression are
as follows. Variables that varies across products and time are: the corrected Firm’s size
variable, in order to proxy firm’s brand image that spills over all its products, a dummy
variable indicating if the product was launched in the previous year to proxy for entry lag
disadvantages, the corrected Hirschmand-Herfinda¨hl index, the product’s market share
and other products’ joint market share; a variable that varies across products but is time
invariant is the dummy indicating if the product was launched before the censored date,
January 1, 1991. Likewise, variables that varies across markets and time are: molecule age
to proxy for inverse efficiency, the number of generic products in the market; a variable
that varies across markets but is time invariant is the dummy indicating if the age of the
molecule is censored in January 1, 1991. Firm’s size and molecule age are included in log
form in order to give more weight to differences in small vales than in large values.
Among the competition variables we include the number of generics and the Hirschmand-
Herfinda¨hl concentration index. Both variables are potentially endogenous, accordingly
the former is lagged one period and the latter is corrected excluding the squared market
share of the product under analysis. We also include the market shares of the product
under analysis and of other drugs of the same corporation in the market, since we would
expect that higher sales lead to higher prices. Again both variables could be regarded as
endogenous and we lag them one period.
For the purposes of this paper, the most important independent variable is the one
describing multimarket contact. Provided with this measure of multimarket contact, we
consider two different specifications for Ω(MMCikt). Firstly,
(A.1) Ω(MMCikt) = α1 AVMMCikt
which is independent of the characteristics of the focal market. This specification
can allow us to test the sign and significance of the effect that the variable measuring
multimarket contact has on prices in average terms. A positive and significant sign for α1
would be consistent with the traditional view on multimarket contact, but it could also
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be measuring the effects of omitted variables highly related to multimarket contact, such
as the establishment size.
Secondly,
(A.2) Ω(MMCikt, θkt) = α(θkt) AVMMCikt
where the assumption in (A.1) is now relaxed allowing for heterogeneity of the multi-
market contact effect across markets. The effect of a specific contact in market k can be
stated as a function of the ease of collusion in the market, θk in a way which represents
the transfer of market power from one market to others. We use the variable HHIk, to
measure ease of collusion adopting the result of most dynamic oligopoly models by which
the higher the market concentration the more collusive the output of the repeated game.
Following a specification by Gimeno and Woo (1995) also used by Ferna´ndez and Mar´ın
(1998), we specify α(θ(HHIkt)) as
α(θ(HHIkt)) = α1 + α2 HHIkt
Therefore, we can rewrite (A.2) as
(A.2b) Ω(MMC ikt, θ(HHIkt)) = α1 AVMMCikt + α2 HHIkt AVMMCikt
According to Bernheim and Whinston (1990), we expect to observe α1 > 0, which means
that in markets with little capacity of collusion, i.e., low HHIk, MMC has a positive
effect on prices. This effect has to decrease as the ease of collusion, measured by HHIk,
increases, i.e., we expect α2 < 0. Additionally, the theory predicts that α(θkt) is to be
equal to zero for a value of HHIk between the minimum and the maximum values in
our set of observations. Summing up, the effect of multimarket contact is expected to
be greater in absolute terms if the variable measuring the ease of collusion in the focal
market, HHIk, is among either the largest or the smallest in the sample, being positive
in markets with very low values for HHIk and negative in markets with very high values
for HHIk. The analysis is invariant to the alternative definition of multimarket contacts
where the variable MMC is the average of the sum of the weighted contacts of each firm
in the focal market and as such is invariant within markets.
5 Preliminary results and interpretation
5.1 Results from baseline specifications
Tables 3 to 5 present the set of basic results, running a regression of Log (Price) on the
set of quality and competition characteristics as well as multimarket contact variables
explained above and when the market is defined as the molecule and the multimarket
variables are firm specific (as defined in 6). In these and other tables the results are
shown with the countries grouped from the more market friendly ones to the more heav-
ily regulated in prices. The regressions in all cases include time trends and fixed effects
at the corporation level. Accordingly, the t-statistics shown in parenthesis are computed
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with robust standard errors clustering the observations by corporations. Table 2 does
not include multimarket contact variables. Its purpose is to show to what extent the
remaining variables explain prices in the different countries and the type of consequences
that the omission of relevant structural variables entails. It can be seen that variables
New, Fsize, Priceg and Molage have the expected signs in all the cases, however not
significant in very few of them. Firm size, Fsize, is highly significant, indicating that
large corporations enjoy higher prices either because its products are of higher quality or
perceived as such. Molage has a negative impact showing that the prices fall with the
life-cycle of the molecule. However, Censormol which is expected also to have a negative
effect appear to be with the wrong sign but with weak significance in most cases. These
variables proxy molecule efficiency since new molecules are expected to improve upon pre-
viously existing molecules. New is also negative, indicating that new products launched
in an existing market suffer from some late entry disadvantage.
Consistently, Censorlag is positive in most cases, showing that products launched in
the market before January 1991 maintain higher prices than those launched later within
the same market. For three countries where regulation is more stringent, this variable
appears with positive sign. The latter may be indicating that old products which are
likely to belong to large corporations suffer from price regulation. In most cases however
the variable is not significantly different from zero. Regarding the number of generics, the
expected sign of this variable is not necessarily well defined. As explained in the intro-
duction, the existence of generics on a market does not mean that brand name products
will reduce their prices. The evidence presented by the specialized literature is mixed. In
some cases, the presence of generics will have the impact of concentrating brand name
products over the inelastic portion of the demand which will then increase the price of
this products. Hence, the expected sign of the number of generics will be positive. On the
other hand, the number of generics or generic competition, will reduce prices for everyone
whenever, for instance, the quality of the existing products is not necessarily perceived to
be high enough. In any case in this firs set of regressions this variable does not appear to
explain much of the price variations.
The HHI concentration index, HHI − corr, is not significant and in some cases appear
with the wrong sign. For the Market share of the product, Mshare, and of other cor-
poration’s products in the same market, Cshare, the expected signs are observed except
for the particular cases of Canada, France and Spain. These variables are lagged be-
fore including them in the regressions for obvious potential endogeneity problems. Also,
for the majority of less regulated countries, Mshare is significant while Cshare is not,
and taking Japan as an exception, these variables are not significant for highly regulated
countries. The unintuitive results for the signs of the variables proxying competition may
be due to inconsistent estimators because of the omission of variables that are related
to market power in the dynamic game. These is expected to be true for Canada where
prices are expected to be highly market based while in Spain and France the inclusion of
the omitted variables may not solve the question because of interactions with particular
regulatory arrangements.
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From these first set of results interesting preliminary conclusions can be drawn. First, it
appears that most attributes and quality characteristics explains a reasonable portion of
price variations which is robust across countries. This suggest that different degrees of
regulation does not distorts the effects of these attributes. The only attribute that seems
to have a different effect with respect to the level of regulation is Censorlag, although
the significance of the variable is in general poor. With respect to variables controlling
competition, apart from the number of generics, although not significant in many cases at
least the signs appear correct for most less regulated countries, excluding Canada, while
two of the four regulated countries have wrong signs.
Table 4 presents the results of the same regressions after including the average multimar-
ket contact variable, AVMMC. All other coefficients remain fairly stable and AVMMC is
positive and significant for Canada and less evident for the UK, it is not significant for
the rest of the countries excluding France where it is negative and significant.
Table 5 allows for the possibility of a differentiated effect of AVMMC on prices depending
on the concentration of the reference market, that proxies ease of collusion. According
to the theory, in presence of multimarket contact, prices are expected to fall in markets
where it is easier to reach collusive outcomes whilst they are expected to increase where it
is more difficult to collude. This means that the coefficient for AVMMC, α1, is expected
to be positive and the coefficient for AVMMC*HHI , α2,is expected to be negative, with
the latter larger in absolute value than the former. The results for the less regulated
countries plus France are strongly consistent with the theory except for the UK, i.e., both
coefficients are significant, have the expected signs and |α2| > α1, for US, Canada, Ger-
many the Netherlands and France (see figure 1). In addition, the coefficients are weakly
consistent, e.g., have the expected signs but either one or both of them are not significant,
for UK and Spain. Only for the case of Italy the coefficients contradict the theory in both
cases and for Japan the sign of α2 is incorrect. In addition, after controlling for these
effects, the coefficients associated to HHI − corr, Mshare and Cshare appear with the
correct sign with the first two groups of countries however not significant in some cases.
For the heavily regulated countries still nonintuitive signs remains with the vast majority
being not significant.
As shown in the previous results, the estimation of this preliminary version of the model
performs well enough. It is clear that prices are determined according to market rules in
more liberalised countries while they behave quite independently of economic variables
in more regulated markets. The analysis needs to be extended in several dimensions:
broader markets, such as anatomic therapeutical classes, that encompass several mole-
cules, panel data techniques, instrumental variables, .... Some of this extensions will be
easily implemented as soon as more data become available to the researchers.
5.2 Sensibility analysis: MMC and Market definitions
We perform two different exercises to test for the sensibility of the results. On one hand
we change the definition of the multimarket variables MMC to allow only for changes
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of average multimarket contacts in explaining price variation. To this end we use the
mutimarket variable computed as in the second definition in section 3.2. On the other
hand, we broaden the definition of a relevant market and consider the four-digit group-
ing of the ATC classification or ATC4. Accordingly, a market is defined as the group of
molecules or chemical substances that belongs to the same chemical, pharmacological and
therapeutical set.
Table 6 presents the analogue to Table 5 considering the alternative definition of the
MMC variable (see equation 7). No remarkable changes appear to occur either on the
variables controlling for firm and market characteristics and those controlling for competi-
tive elements not including theMMC variables. Perhaps the only change worth to notice
is that of the increase of the MMC variables marginal effect both in size and significance
for some countries. As shown in the summary Table A, α1 more than double for the
US, the Netherlands and the UK and also |α2| increases considerably, while remaining
almost unchanged for the rest of the countries where the effects of multimarket contacts
are consistent with the theory.
Table A: Marginal effects of MMC variables by definition
(Robust T-statistics in parenthesis)
Def./Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Definition 1
AVMMCikt−1 0.037 0.150 0.031 0.035 0.063 0.020 -0.053 0.004 0.088
(1.08) (5.55) (2.83) (2.22) (0.99) (1.92) (-0.62) (0.09) (0.78)
AVMMCikt−1∗ -0.069 -0.192 -0.034 -0.040 -0.044 -0.089 0.164 0.012 -0.313
HHIkt−1 (-2.00) (-6.70) (-4.15) (-2.13) (-0.43) (-4.46) (1.03) (0.20) (-1.13)
Definition 2
AVMMCkt−1 0.118 0.128 0.045 0.201 0.154 0.021 -0.035 -0.033 0.055
(4.18) (5.99) (6.95) (4.09) (2.27) (2.08) (-0.66) (-0.61) (0.42)
AVMMCkt−1∗ -0.139 -0.172 -0.042 -0.223 -0.146 -0.069 0.119 0.037 -0.205
HHIkt−1 (-2.59) (-6.58) (-4.63) (-3.68) (-1.52) (-3.68) (1.04) (0.62) (-0.71)
The explanation for these result seems to be purely statistical. Given the sign of effect
of multimarket contacts in the market, if changing the definition reduces the variability
of the AVMMC regressors when averaging within markets, the size of this effect may
increase in absolute value.
Tables 7 to 9 presents an entire set of results for the alternative market definition (ATC4).
For this purpose the following variables have been calculated for the new market defini-
tion, Ngenerics, Priceg, Mshare, Cshare, HHI − corr and AVMMC, the rest remain
unaffected for this exercise. The results for the marginal effects of the variables control-
ling for attributes parallel those obtained with the narrower market definition. Focusing
our attention to the more general specification (reported in Table 9), it appear to be an
increase of the marginal effects of New and Molage in absolute values. Other difference
comparing to the base results is that the effect of Ngenerics is now significant for many
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more countries and it is positive in the great majority of these cases (Germany, Nether-
lands, Japan and Spain). In general, broadening the market definition appears to affect
size and significance of the hypotheses derived from the multimarket contact theory to
the point of rejecting them from the data in most cases. Curiously, the results for Italy
that before rejected the theory now seems to fit in it very well.
As a very preliminary conclusion, the results as it could be expected are very sensitive
to changes on the side of the market definition. However, changing from a the molecule
definition to the ATC4 definition may be a too difficult condition to satisfy for the theory.
A more rigorous analysis should require small variation in the definition of a relevant mar-
ket, perhaps including specific molecules that are closer substitutes to each other. At this
point the information available does not allow us for these type of exercises nevertheless
it is an important item in the future research agenda.
5.3 A first extension on the regulatory effects
In subsection 2.2 we have discussed informally the likely effects of stringent price regula-
tions such as some forms of capping prices. The literature on the matter suggests that one
effect is that of increasing instances of higher concentration, that is limiting competition
in some markets [See Cabrales (2003) for a discussion and a theoretical explanation]. If
this would be the case, a natural trend to higher concentrated market will be observed in
the group of highly regulated countries. Furthermore, from the perspective of the multi-
market contact theory, this trend should be reflected in a greater effect of re-distribution
of market power from markets with suitable conditions to sustain collusive equilibria to
more competitive ones. In short, we would expect higher values both for |α1| and |α2|
in more regulated countries. From the base model results in table 5, the two cases in
which the parameters of interest have the predicted sign, France and Spain, have greater
figures for α2 than the more market based countries except for Canada, however |α1|. A
direct way to test the implications of this discussion is to pool the countries’ sub-samples
and conduct a joint regression analysis. This preliminary extension is done under the
consideration that from Table 5 the size of the marginal effects, at least for the significant
quality variables are not extremely different across countries which allow us to control for
differences in the size effect of the variables of interest, in particular α1 and α2.
Tables 10 and 11 present the results for two sets of 6 regressions considering the two alter-
native definition for the MMC variables (as presented in equations 6 and 7) respectively.
In addition to the usual set of regressors, whose results are shown in columns (1) to (3)
of these tables, we consider interacting the following variables Ngenerics, AVMMC and
AVMMC ∗HHI with a dummy, Dumreg, indicating whether the observation pertains
to one of the four highly regulated countries in the sample . Likewise we included country
specific dummy variables to account for idiosyncratic elements at this level. The results
show again that the significant quality variables are not affected by the omission of the
MMC variables. The number of generics still has no predictive power in any case while
the other competition variables appear with the correct sign and statistic significance
only in the full versions of the models, (3) and (6). The marginal effects for AVMMC
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and AVMMC ∗ HHI are significant and consistent with the prediction that the latter
should be greater than the former in absolute value. Furthermore, the marginal effects of
the interaction of Dumreg with the last two variables have on one side a not significant
value for AVMMC and a significant and negative one for AVMMC ∗HHI. Hence, the
results suggest that the multimarket contact alone does not have a differentiated effect
for distinct regulatory levels, while the strategic effect of market power re-distribution has
a significant and sizeable difference. In fact the marginal effect of AVMMC ∗HHI for
less regulated countries appear to be of the order of 1
3
the value for a highly regulated
one. Therefore our initial conjecture seems not to be in line with the data. Rather than
that the results in Table (10) suggests that stringent price regulation , which we think is
better understood as direct price caps, is reducing prices in the regulated markets as well
as markets where there is more competition and therefore less regulation.
Table 11 show the results for the second definition of the MMC variable. In this case it
is rejected a differentiated effect controlling for regulation levels for both AVMMC and
AVMMC ∗HHI; thus, the previous result is not robust to changes in the definition of
the multimarket contact variable. However, it would be interesting for policy making a
more detailed analysis of the consequences of stringent price regulations over the strategic
behavior of firms which is in turn influenced by the structure of the industry. The first
set of results, for instance, is a warning for the likely effects of price regulations since
it implies that regulation apart from increasing concentration in some markets will also
have a more strategic effect of distributing this increased market power to sustain higher
prices in more competitive instances. Then, the ultimate objective of regulation which
is to reduce prices and reduce the burden of medicines over health system’s expenditures
will not be guaranteed.
6 Concluding remarks
The theoretical literature of dynamic oligopoly models have proposed some interesting
results from the situation in which firms contact with their rivals in several markets. A
traditional view predicts the Mutual Forbearance Hypothesis by which firms may increase
the set of collusive equilibria because of repeated interactions in many independent mar-
kets. Furthermore, when appropriate incentive constraints permits, multimarket contact
may also promote the re-distribution of market power from markets with easier conditions
for collusion to markets where colluding is more difficult. The first hypothesis has been
successfully studied for several industries such as the US’s industries of cement, cellular
communications, airline services, banking and others while studies for Europe have been
conducted for the Banking industry and the Spanish hotel industry, the latter been also
approached considering the re-distribution of market power. We expand on this empirical
literature by considering the effects of the multimarket structure in the pharmaceutical
industry for nine countries of the OECD. The cross country nature of the data allow us
to control for a very important feature of the industry which is the different degrees of
regulation and in particular price controls. We perform Panel Data regressions for speci-
fications in which we incorporate several important issues such as the relevance of quality
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variables in the industry, the importance of corporation fixed effects to control for quality
product differentiation, and an instrumental variables argument to control for possible
endogeneity of variables related to the competitive environment. The multimarket struc-
ture is also part of the specification in such a way that provides a simple relation between
the contacts and the ease of collusion across markets to test both the traditional and the
more strategically based hypotheses predicted by the theory. The baseline model appears
to fit the hypotheses of multimarket contact reasonably well for the case of less regulated
markets, while the results are unclear for the more regulated ones. This confirms that
in more regulated markets there are some existing distortions that are interacting with
market forces.
Nevertheless, we take one step ahead and propose a way in which regulation may be
altering the effects of multimarket contacts. In particular, the informal observation in
the literature of the industry that more regulated countries tend to have less competition
and in some cases more concentrated markets for drugs suggest that in these cases the
size of the re-distribution of market power should be expected to be higher than in more
market friendly countries. Based on the observation that in general the marginal effects
of the quality variables and some competition variables does not change too widely across
countries in the sample we pool the countries’ sub-sample and interact the multimarket
variables with an indicator variable for heavily regulated markets. Although the results
are not robust to the definition of the multimarket variable, they suggest that our con-
jecture is not supported and on the contrary, market intervention in more concentrated
markets induces a reduction in prices also in more competitive -less regulated- markets.
These result is of paramount importance for policy making. Since price controls and re-
lated regulatory systems barely take into account the structure of the industry and its
peculiarities, our work could be of great interest to empirically predict undesirable effects
of public interventions in this particular case. For instance, reducing prices in more com-
petitive markets may discourage entry and may have a negative dynamic effect in the
development of the industry. Therefore, this could be used as an alternative explanation
for the observation that in highly regulated markets entry is less dynamic [c.f. Danzon
and Furukawa (2003), Kyle (2005)].
Possible extensions of this analysis include specializing for specific product markets such
as anti-ulcer or anti-hypertensive drugs. Focusing in cases will help to model in a more
precise fashion features such as horizontal product and vertical product differentiation,
precise definitions of price regulations on their strategic effects and so on. Likewise, we
have also drop the idea of defining a group of countries as different markets of the same
industry structure much in the way states of the US are considered. For example, contacts
among firms inside the EU could also be a dimension to study.
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Figure 1: Effect of multimarket contact in selected markets. Market definition: molecule
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Panel A: Summary statistics by country
No. markets No. No. molecule ATC4
Type country molec. ATC4 corp. products HHI HHI
(A) (C) A/C mean median mean median
I Canada 867 213 160 2552 .159 .080 .23 .148
US 1574 264 621 7170 .531 .492 .167 .093
II Germany 1874 261 587 6985 .514 .451 .152 .082
Nether 421 146 87 1148 .668 .764 .365 .246
UK 618 189 147 1143 .663 .830 .377 .283
III France 782 214 164 1929 .569 .500 .254 .191
Italy 726 215 253 1992 .533 .499 .265 .179
Japan 674 181 174 2401 .508 .435 .253 .163
Spain 660 220 179 1693 .523 .496 .295 .205
Panel B: Distribution of corporations by country
Type country 1 2-4 5-9 10-14 15-20 21+ Total
I Canada 48 30 30 15 4 33 160
US 232 178 91 26 22 72 621
II Germany 208 141 94 46 32 66 587
Nether 18 28 14 9 5 13 87
UK 49 45 25 7 8 13 147
III France 54 46 30 10 5 19 164
Italy 65 81 49 30 11 17 253
Japan 32 32 43 20 19 28 174
Spain 43 45 36 22 15 18 179
Panel C: Distribution of molecule age by country
Type country 1 1-2 3-4 4-7 7-10 11+ Total
I Canada 17 107 104 247 309 83 867
US 17 190 246 418 405 298 1,574
II Germany 45 338 218 423 512 338 1,874
Nether 12 64 67 132 100 46 421
UK 17 93 104 212 130 62 618
III France 24 94 126 294 151 93 782
Italy 16 96 136 264 143 71 726
Japan 8 104 123 191 171 77 674
Spain 22 106 119 215 127 71 660
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Table 2: Summary of Statistics for Alternative MMC definitions
Country MMC Def. mean N S.D. min max
Canada ANMCCi 8.211206 7152 11.49036 0 56
ANMCCk 30.67695 7152 34.63271 0 288
WANMMCi 3.321367 7152 4.564277 0 23.31293
WANMMCk 4.012449 7152 5.102903 0 40.64036
US ANMCCi 3.655273 15288 5.018546 0 44
ANMCCk 13.38363 15288 15.81597 0 156
WANMMCi 1.378756 15288 1.887686 0 21.26602
WANMMCk 1.246454 15288 1.629568 0 17.39792
Germany ANMCCi 12.33581 17088 17.17776 0 96
ANMCCk 54.63219 17088 72.55975 0 633
WANMMCi 4.371994 17088 7.550694 0 43.61862
WANMMCk 4.095285 17088 5.26308 0 60.53645
Nether ANMCCi 10.70754 2584 13.88268 0 68
ANMCCk 29.77987 2584 32.43827 0 290
WANMMCi 6.338841 2584 8.163896 0 41.52764
WANMMCk 1.800272 2584 2.071789 0 16.65326
UK ANMCCi 1.192754 3030 2.751902 0 22
ANMCCk 3.262869 3030 6.466102 0 72
WANMMCi .7273696 3030 1.831923 0 14.53169
WANMMCk .6189357 3030 1.604083 0 15.78605
France ANMCCi 10.45419 5779 16.03264 0 65
ANMCCk 28.51955 5779 39.76581 0 269
WANMMCi 2.902696 5779 4.333551 0 19.00611
WANMMCk 3.275765 5779 4.624059 0 51.90288
Italy ANMCCi 1.206306 5687 2.296243 0 18
ANMCCk 3.363442 5687 5.665746 0 41.33333
WANMMCi .3093299 5687 .5683802 0 4.732255
WANMMCk .4180106 5687 1.028211 0 13.19793
Japan ANMCCi 3.209296 5268 4.760009 0 41
ANMCCk 10.73129 5268 14.53885 0 135
WANMMCi 1.105852 5268 1.57031 0 13.41884
WANMMCk 1.051169 5268 2.366547 0 20.04237
Spain ANMCCi 1.71324 5018 2.913971 0 16
ANMCCk 4.933521 5018 7.398479 0 50
WANMMCi .467612 5018 .747091 0 4.525763
WANMMCk .4922954 5018 .8641015 0 7.72376
Note:
Subindex i refers to a definition that varies across corporations, while subindex k
to a definition that varies across markets
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Table 3: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Without controlling for multimarket contact. Market definition: molecule
(Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.037 -0.312 -0.185 -0.196 -0.289 -0.162 -0.190 -0.145 -0.191
(-0.82) (-4.76) (-6.28) (-2.79) (-5.39) (-3.52) (-4.41) (-3.13) (-3.92)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.218 0.281 0.202 0.110 0.199 0.167 0.155 0.299 0.151
(14.77) (10.53) (14.50) (4.41) (9.51) (8.37) (6.95) (12.18) (6.85)
Ln(Molage)t -0.404 -0.232 -0.171 -0.101 -0.240 -0.168 -0.131 -0.080 -0.324
(-6.01) (-2.62) (-5.00) (-1.41) (-2.38) (-2.21) (-2.32) (-1.14) (-4.46)
Censormolt -0.039 0.043 0.071 -0.073 -0.496 0.041 0.084 0.207 0.177
(-0.52) (0.36) (1.32) (-0.61) (-2.25) (0.30) (0.69) (0.88) (1.11)
Censorlagt 0.408 0.093 0.046 0.180 1.116 0.410 -0.140 -0.543 -0.116
(1.74) (0.21) (0.45) (1.47) (3.21) (1.97) (-0.49) (-1.24) (-0.39)
ngenericst−1 0.001 -0.003 0.006 0.033 0.032 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.006
(0.28) (-0.95) (3.39) (4.34) (1.66) (-1.11) (-1.26) (1.41) (1.38)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.555 0.541 0.651 0.856 0.612 0.668 0.687 0.603 0.694
(15.59) (14.69) (22.00) (29.03) (15.32) (17.89) (20.44) (20.21) (17.86)
Dupricegt−1 -1.142 -1.362 -1.440 -1.261 -1.216 -1.489 -1.087 -0.671 -0.845
(-8.15) (-8.76) (-13.46) (-1.92) (-6.02) (-6.83) (-6.35) (-3.14) (-4.32)
HHI-corrt−1 0.148 -0.703 -0.114 0.295 0.361 -0.219 0.296 0.134 -0.375
(1.17) (-2.99) (-1.26) (1.73) (1.55) (-1.58) (2.30) (1.01) (-2.27)
Msharet−1 0.563 -0.272 0.474 0.664 0.477 0.210 0.112 0.570 -0.284
(4.32) (-1.06) (4.59) (3.95) (2.10) (1.55) (0.99) (3.49) (-2.32)
Csharet−1 0.047 -0.643 0.026 0.339 0.299 -0.268 0.268 0.314 -0.288
(0.50) (-2.53) (0.24) (1.49) (0.95) (-1.41) (2.19) (1.74) (-1.58)
cons 1.604 0.326 -0.068 -0.293 0.695 0.127 0.160 -2.258 1.796
(2.91) (0.41) (-0.25) (-0.44) (0.78) (0.18) (0.33) (-3.62) (3.22)
N 15288 7149 17088 2584 3030 5779 5687 5268 5018
R2 0.475 0.540 0.654 0.819 0.585 0.610 0.701 0.729 0.647
F 101.39 129.71 504.47 340.45 73.14 144.51 140.50 217.77 161.30
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Table 4: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Linear average multimarket contact control. Market definition: molecule
(Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.044 -0.299 -0.183 -0.191 -0.298 -0.167 -0.192 -0.139 -0.194
(-0.94) (-4.51) (-6.18) (-2.69) (-5.75) (-3.67) (-4.44) (-3.02) (-3.99)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.219 0.288 0.202 0.109 0.199 0.164 0.156 0.298 0.152
(14.87) (10.45) (14.48) (4.37) (9.50) (8.62) (7.00) (12.20) (6.81)
Ln(Molage)t -0.409 -0.175 -0.156 -0.101 -0.226 -0.197 -0.128 -0.074 -0.329
(-6.27) (-1.95) (-4.57) (-1.42) (-2.22) (-2.63) (-2.29) (-1.06) (-4.57)
Censormolt -0.038 0.017 0.075 -0.054 -0.483 0.060 0.082 0.197 0.168
(-0.51) (0.15) (1.42) (-0.43) (-2.20) (0.44) (0.69) (0.83) (1.05)
Censorlagt 0.413 0.089 0.050 0.177 1.089 0.350 -0.142 -0.533 -0.108
(1.75) (0.20) (0.49) (1.53) (3.16) (1.66) (-0.50) (-1.21) (-0.36)
ngenericst−1 0.000 -0.002 0.007 0.032 0.033 -0.008 -0.003 0.007 0.006
(0.18) (-0.51) (3.74) (4.01) (1.65) (-1.44) (-1.07) (1.41) (1.33)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.554 0.539 0.652 0.857 0.614 0.674 0.688 0.605 0.694
(15.77) (14.61) (21.94) (28.90) (15.30) (18.91) (20.48) (20.29) (17.86)
Dupricegt−1 -1.132 -1.308 -1.445 -1.259 -1.216 -1.535 -1.080 -0.650 -0.838
(-8.12) (-8.53) (-13.61) (-1.91) (-5.98) (-7.54) (-6.33) (-3.11) (-4.32)
HHI-corrt−1 0.142 -0.572 -0.087 0.327 0.366 -0.309 0.309 0.140 -0.405
(1.19) (-2.54) (-0.89) (1.83) (1.53) (-2.15) (2.45) (1.04) (-2.22)
Msharet−1 0.547 -0.083 0.521 0.671 0.521 0.091 0.131 0.583 -0.327
(4.95) (-0.34) (4.87) (3.90) (2.10) (0.65) (1.11) (3.61) (-2.30)
Csharet−1 0.043 -0.511 0.025 0.426 0.299 -0.310 0.279 0.279 -0.359
(0.47) (-2.04) (0.25) (1.86) (0.91) (-1.74) (2.32) (1.51) (-1.82)
AVMMCt−1 -0.006 0.044 0.010 0.008 0.031 -0.019 0.030 0.010 -0.059
(-0.30) (2.68) (1.39) (1.41) (1.70) (-3.40) (0.54) (0.39) (-0.85)
cons 1.669 -0.412 -0.253 -0.323 0.543 0.481 0.113 -2.316 1.879
(3.21) (-0.51) (-0.90) (-0.48) (0.59) (0.71) (0.24) (-3.71) (3.41)
N 15288 7149 17088 2584 3030 5779 5687 5268 5018
R2 0.474 0.546 0.657 0.819 0.586 0.619 0.701 0.730 0.646
F 97.17 135.80 454.58 324.08 70.86 141.26 131.79 203.82 147.48
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Table 5: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corpora-
tion fixed effects. The effect of the MMC depends on concentration. Market definition:
molecule (Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.043 -0.269 -0.185 -0.207 -0.297 -0.156 -0.193 -0.140 -0.186
(-0.92) (-4.41) (-6.43) (-2.90) (-5.75) (-3.32) (-4.50) (-2.99) (-4.04)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.220 0.297 0.204 0.114 0.199 0.165 0.156 0.298 0.151
(15.00) (10.85) (14.87) (4.61) (9.60) (8.67) (7.05) (12.18) (6.95)
Ln(Molage)t -0.396 -0.125 -0.152 -0.097 -0.226 -0.175 -0.130 -0.076 -0.324
(-6.04) (-1.55) (-4.41) (-1.36) (-2.22) (-2.30) (-2.29) (-1.08) (-4.51)
Censormolt -0.036 -0.085 0.087 -0.057 -0.467 0.022 0.085 0.189 0.182
(-0.49) (-0.71) (1.65) (-0.44) (-2.01) (0.16) (0.71) (0.80) (1.15)
Censorlagt 0.406 0.082 0.037 0.164 1.076 0.366 -0.143 -0.523 -0.123
(1.73) (0.18) (0.37) (1.37) (3.09) (1.75) (-0.50) (-1.20) (-0.41)
ngenericst−1 0.001 0.001 0.009 0.036 0.035 -0.006 -0.003 0.007 0.006
(0.54) (0.34) (4.63) (4.38) (1.73) (-1.16) (-1.10) (1.42) (1.16)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.553 0.533 0.649 0.852 0.614 0.672 0.688 0.605 0.695
(15.78) (14.91) (22.26) (28.83) (15.26) (18.97) (20.50) (20.32) (18.01)
Dupricegt−1 -1.145 -1.358 -1.458 -1.252 -1.218 -1.547 -1.076 -0.648 -0.849
(-8.20) (-8.98) (-13.61) (-1.91) (-5.95) (-7.58) (-6.32) (-3.10) (-4.46)
HHI-corrt−1 0.281 0.116 0.108 0.690 0.437 -0.014 0.258 0.124 -0.263
(1.97) (0.47) (0.86) (2.17) (1.34) (-0.08) (1.70) (0.66) (-1.20)
Msharet−1 0.666 0.477 0.651 0.941 0.581 0.302 0.098 0.572 -0.239
(5.35) (1.93) (5.98) (3.89) (2.03) (1.91) (0.73) (3.12) (-1.55)
Csharet−1 0.161 0.087 0.175 0.761 0.365 -0.048 0.234 0.266 -0.241
(1.50) (0.33) (1.59) (2.44) (1.00) (-0.23) (1.70) (1.10) (-1.05)
AVMMCt−1 0.037 0.150 0.031 0.035 0.063 0.020 -0.053 0.004 0.088
(1.08) (5.55) (2.83) (2.22) (0.99) (1.92) (-0.62) (0.09) (0.78)
AVMMCt−1* -0.069 -0.192 -0.034 -0.040 -0.044 -0.089 0.164 0.012 -0.313
HHI-corrt−1 (-2.00) (-6.70) (-4.15) (-2.13) (-0.43) (-4.46) (1.03) (0.20) (-1.13)
cons 1.450 -1.331 -0.415 -0.645 0.485 0.117 0.157 -2.295 1.760
(2.76) (-1.88) (-1.38) (-0.88) (0.56) (0.17) (0.32) (-3.60) (3.15)
N 15288 7149 17088 2584 3030 5779 5687 5268 5018
R2 0.475 0.557 0.658 0.820 0.586 0.621 0.701 0.730 0.647
F 101.14 124.56 451.58 367.29 69.16 136.81 126.93 196.39 143.67
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Table 6: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. The effect of the MMC depends on concentration. MMC fixed within
markets. Market definition: molecule (Robust Standard Errors by Corporation Clusters)
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 -0.038 -0.275 -0.183 -0.183 -0.296 -0.160 -0.193 -0.144 -0.198
(-0.83) (-4.42) (-6.15) (-2.71) (-5.70) (-3.30) (-4.49) (-3.12) (-4.24)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.221 0.292 0.203 0.108 0.201 0.166 0.158 0.299 0.150
(15.18) (11.42) (14.83) (4.79) (9.58) (8.38) (7.16) (12.28) (6.97)
Ln(Molage)t -0.378 -0.130 -0.123 -0.088 -0.228 -0.169 -0.129 -0.085 -0.328
(-5.71) (-1.60) (-3.44) (-1.23) (-2.24) (-2.16) (-2.31) (-1.18) (-4.54)
Censormolt -0.029 -0.046 0.123 -0.091 -0.444 0.022 0.087 0.214 0.175
(-0.39) (-0.38) (2.35) (-0.71) (-1.97) (0.16) (0.73) (0.91) (1.10)
Censorlagt 0.384 0.090 -0.001 0.201 1.060 0.416 -0.153 -0.543 -0.115
(1.61) (0.20) (-0.01) (1.65) (3.14) (2.00) (-0.54) (-1.24) (-0.39)
ngenericst−1 0.002 -0.005 0.009 0.030 0.038 -0.005 -0.003 0.007 0.006
(0.91) (-1.63) (4.57) (5.04) (2.00) (-0.95) (-1.06) (1.39) (1.27)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.557 0.533 0.644 0.853 0.612 0.673 0.686 0.603 0.696
(15.55) (15.42) (21.84) (30.71) (15.20) (18.50) (20.77) (20.32) (17.86)
Dupricegt−1 -1.127 -1.412 -1.455 -1.544 -1.168 -1.532 -1.079 -0.698 -0.847
(-7.86) (-9.65) (-13.11) (-3.47) (-5.54) (-7.32) (-6.34) (-3.33) (-4.38)
HHI-corrt−1 0.384 0.031 0.140 0.792 0.545 -0.034 0.274 0.089 -0.298
(2.77) (0.12) (1.32) (3.05) (2.20) (-0.19) (2.00) (0.58) (-1.42)
Msharet−1 0.795 0.416 0.743 1.057 0.680 0.314 0.113 0.542 -0.264
(5.74) (1.49) (6.60) (5.08) (2.98) (1.92) (0.93) (3.20) (-1.76)
Csharet−1 0.254 0.003 0.202 0.846 0.440 -0.096 0.270 0.249 -0.246
(2.40) (0.01) (1.77) (3.01) (1.47) (-0.43) (2.20) (1.29) (-1.09)
AVMMCt−1 0.118 0.128 0.045 0.201 0.154 0.021 -0.035 -0.033 0.055
(4.18) (5.99) (6.95) (4.09) (2.27) (2.08) (-0.66) (-0.61) (0.42)
AVMMCt−1* -0.139 -0.172 -0.042 -0.223 -0.146 -0.069 0.119 0.037 -0.205
HHI-corrt−1 (-2.59) (-6.58) (-4.63) (-3.68) (-1.52) (-3.68) (1.04) (0.62) (-0.71)
cons 1.169 -1.161 -0.711 -0.779 0.396 0.051 0.139 -2.183 1.821
(2.15) (-1.65) (-2.29) (-1.13) (0.45) (0.07) (0.29) (-3.35) (3.24)
N 15288 7149 17088 2584 3030 5779 5687 5268 5018
R2 0.476 0.555 0.658 0.829 0.585 0.618 0.701 0.730 0.646
F 102.98 124.37 423.96 357.33 67.17 129.02 115.54 193.11 148.72
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Table 7: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Without controlling for multimarket contact. Market definition: ATC4
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 0.006 -0.291 -0.199 -0.184 -0.202 -0.170 -0.313 -0.215 -0.284
(0.13) (-4.04) (-5.18) (-2.06) (-3.11) (-3.54) (-5.45) (-3.48) (-4.36)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.221 0.305 0.255 0.223 0.251 0.204 0.277 0.466 0.222
(14.19) (10.52) (20.09) (10.74) (8.97) (10.72) (12.07) (15.38) (9.46)
Ln(Molage)t -0.548 -0.597 -0.510 -0.087 0.128 -0.035 -0.103 -0.153 -0.569
(-3.66) (-4.45) (-5.74) (-0.78) (0.89) (-0.25) (-0.88) (-0.99) (-4.72)
Censormolt -0.119 0.009 -0.084 -0.052 -0.295 0.037 -0.171 0.240 0.360
(-1.80) (0.08) (-1.48) (-0.42) (-1.28) (0.33) (-0.92) (1.84) (3.51)
Censorlagt 0.306 -0.387 0.178 -0.120 0.908 0.378 -1.507 -1.390 -0.227
(1.11) (-0.83) (1.40) (-0.97) (2.57) (1.43) (-3.17) (-2.57) (-0.49)
Ngenericst−1 -0.000 0.001 0.005 0.026 0.012 -0.004 -0.013 0.015 0.011
(-0.53) (0.45) (6.04) (6.78) (1.06) (-0.85) (-3.97) (3.99) (3.50)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.448 0.444 0.460 0.647 0.448 0.475 0.473 0.295 0.541
(11.41) (9.53) (14.31) (26.32) (11.63) (10.58) (13.43) (8.00) (10.64)
Dupricegt−1 0.325 0.124 0.618 0.847 0.782 1.361 2.670 -0.303 0.662
(1.93) (0.65) (5.13) (2.80) (1.51) (1.61) (7.29) (-1.90) (2.03)
HHI-corrt−1 0.358 -0.196 0.347 0.113 0.298 0.099 -0.145 0.222 -0.507
(2.55) (-1.18) (3.22) (0.51) (1.23) (0.61) (-0.60) (1.30) (-2.56)
Msharet−1 0.424 -0.100 0.467 0.591 0.467 0.520 -0.170 1.004 -0.536
(2.52) (-0.48) (2.69) (3.01) (2.03) (2.13) (-0.96) (4.28) (-3.00)
Csharet−1 0.207 -0.431 -0.125 -0.099 -0.057 0.078 -0.375 -0.053 -0.489
(1.71) (-2.26) (-0.76) (-0.46) (-0.22) (0.37) (-1.71) (-0.23) (-2.37)
cons 2.622 2.664 2.106 -0.673 -2.539 -1.611 -0.258 -3.371 3.423
(2.07) (2.32) (2.81) (-0.72) (-1.98) (-1.32) (-0.26) (-2.68) (3.37)
N 15173 7127 16964 2579 3026 5767 5663 5249 5009
r2 0.390 0.460 0.498 0.667 0.475 0.460 0.518 0.585 0.516
F 66.19 45.02 152.07 86.20 77.71 116.91 62.32 114.52 57.17
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Table 8: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. Linear average multimarket contact control. Market definition: ATC4
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 0.009 -0.290 -0.194 -0.186 -0.205 -0.171 -0.313 -0.221 -0.282
(0.19) (-4.03) (-5.01) (-2.08) (-3.19) (-3.66) (-5.38) (-3.51) (-4.35)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.222 0.312 0.255 0.224 0.252 0.203 0.277 0.466 0.222
(14.29) (10.71) (20.05) (10.80) (8.92) (10.65) (12.12) (15.40) (9.34)
Ln(Molage)t -0.523 -0.586 -0.433 -0.088 0.153 -0.056 -0.107 -0.137 -0.566
(-3.57) (-4.16) (-4.25) (-0.78) (1.04) (-0.43) (-0.89) (-0.88) (-4.76)
Censormolt -0.118 0.020 -0.053 -0.041 -0.289 0.034 -0.164 0.226 0.364
(-1.78) (0.16) (-0.98) (-0.32) (-1.23) (0.30) (-0.88) (1.70) (3.51)
Censorlagt 0.311 -0.397 0.160 -0.143 0.886 0.386 -1.507 -1.366 -0.228
(1.13) (-0.85) (1.34) (-1.08) (2.51) (1.45) (-3.16) (-2.49) (-0.49)
Ngenericst−1 -0.000 0.002 0.006 0.026 0.014 -0.004 -0.012 0.013 0.011
(-0.11) (1.67) (6.46) (6.86) (1.17) (-0.96) (-4.06) (3.59) (3.50)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.450 0.451 0.456 0.646 0.451 0.474 0.472 0.293 0.538
(11.41) (9.78) (14.25) (26.46) (11.53) (10.71) (13.49) (8.06) (10.82)
Dupricegt−1 0.328 0.158 0.609 0.846 0.794 1.369 2.668 -0.328 0.669
(1.95) (0.81) (5.19) (2.77) (1.54) (1.64) (7.32) (-2.09) (2.06)
HHI-corrt−1 0.364 -0.127 0.425 0.106 0.314 0.072 -0.118 0.179 -0.486
(2.60) (-0.77) (4.13) (0.49) (1.31) (0.43) (-0.53) (1.09) (-2.39)
Msharet−1 0.463 0.073 0.580 0.595 0.524 0.477 -0.125 0.918 -0.503
(2.74) (0.37) (3.37) (3.01) (2.21) (2.28) (-0.79) (4.14) (-2.75)
Csharet−1 0.219 -0.358 -0.060 -0.103 -0.036 0.049 -0.346 -0.098 -0.465
(1.86) (-1.84) (-0.38) (-0.48) (-0.14) (0.24) (-1.70) (-0.43) (-2.33)
AVMMCt−1 0.045 0.119 0.086 0.019 0.075 -0.015 0.136 -0.098 0.089
(1.88) (4.54) (5.60) (1.05) (1.39) (-0.70) (1.16) (-2.41) (0.85)
Cons 2.320 2.232 1.252 -0.697 -2.822 -1.390 -0.276 -3.370 3.362
(1.90) (1.85) (1.43) (-0.75) (-2.16) (-1.23) (-0.27) (-2.69) (3.40)
N 15173 7127 16964 2579 3026 5767 5663 5249 5009
r2 0.391 0.469 0.503 0.667 0.477 0.460 0.519 0.586 0.516
F 62.09 56.68 157.60 92.08 73.20 116.21 68.65 107.05 56.15
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Table 9: Regression results by country. Independent variable Log (Pricet). Corporation
fixed effects. The effect of the MMC depends on concentration. Market definition: ATC4
Variable US CAN GER NETH UK FRA ITA JAP SP
Newt−1 0.010 -0.289 -0.195 -0.166 -0.207 -0.171 -0.313 -0.220 -0.282
(0.20) (-4.02) (-5.01) (-1.83) (-3.21) (-3.70) (-5.34) (-3.43) (-4.35)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.223 0.313 0.256 0.224 0.254 0.203 0.277 0.466 0.222
(14.34) (10.72) (20.02) (10.62) (9.11) (10.61) (12.11) (15.45) (9.34)
Ln(Molage)t -0.498 -0.579 -0.435 -0.082 0.155 -0.056 -0.112 -0.134 -0.566
(-3.54) (-4.05) (-4.31) (-0.72) (1.07) (-0.42) (-0.92) (-0.87) (-4.74)
Censormolt -0.124 0.020 -0.047 -0.049 -0.320 0.034 -0.156 0.226 0.365
(-1.90) (0.16) (-0.86) (-0.38) (-1.35) (0.30) (-0.84) (1.70) (3.52)
Censorlagt 0.310 -0.394 0.157 -0.145 0.897 0.386 -1.534 -1.368 -0.227
(1.14) (-0.84) (1.31) (-1.07) (2.46) (1.45) (-3.22) (-2.50) (-0.49)
Ngenericst−1 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.026 0.012 -0.004 -0.012 0.013 0.011
(0.25) (1.77) (6.45) (6.97) (1.09) (-0.94) (-4.04) (3.63) (3.26)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.448 0.450 0.457 0.652 0.451 0.474 0.475 0.293 0.539
(11.24) (9.81) (14.28) (26.44) (11.61) (10.73) (13.60) (8.07) (10.78)
Dupricegt−1 0.322 0.154 0.610 0.873 0.760 1.369 2.704 -0.330 0.663
(1.88) (0.79) (5.17) (2.92) (1.49) (1.64) (7.54) (-2.09) (2.05)
HHI-corrt−1 0.576 0.041 0.514 -0.258 0.081 0.078 0.131 0.222 -0.440
(3.34) (0.17) (3.70) (-0.87) (0.31) (0.30) (0.57) (0.96) (-2.09)
Msharet−1 0.627 0.195 0.633 0.390 0.353 0.481 0.030 0.945 -0.474
(3.05) (0.78) (3.67) (1.70) (1.44) (1.98) (0.20) (4.06) (-2.80)
Csharet−1 0.367 -0.235 -0.005 -0.378 -0.223 0.054 -0.156 -0.064 -0.431
(2.40) (-1.01) (-0.03) (-1.37) (-0.87) (0.22) (-0.71) (-0.24) (-1.71)
AVMMCt−1 0.116 0.155 0.104 -0.058 -0.059 -0.014 0.418 -0.082 0.140
(1.99) (3.92) (4.82) (-1.69) (-0.78) (-0.50) (2.20) (-1.12) (1.03)
AVMMCt−1* -0.137 -0.080 -0.047 0.138 0.213 -0.002 -0.576 -0.033 -0.114
HHI-corrt−1 (-1.67) (-1.55) (-1.36) (2.59) (1.90) (-0.04) (-2.45) (-0.34) (-0.36)
Cons 1.985 2.082 1.228 -0.538 -2.681 -1.397 -0.359 -3.420 3.342
(1.72) (1.66) (1.40) (-0.57) (-2.12) (-1.20) (-0.35) (-2.80) (3.37)
N 15173 7127 16964 2579 3026 5767 5663 5249 5009
r2 0.391 0.470 0.504 0.670 0.479 0.460 0.521 0.586 0.516
F 65.60 52.56 151.46 101.45 69.44 116.64 66.44 108.50 56.35
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Table 10: Regression results for the pooled sample. Independent variable Log (Pricet).
MMC varies across firms. Corporation fixed effects. Linear average multimarket contact
control. Market definition: Molecule
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.186 0.185 0.185
(20.12) (20.08) (20.13) (20.11) (19.82) (19.91)
Newt−1 -0.130 -0.130 -0.129 -0.130 -0.127 -0.125
(-5.76) (-5.64) (-5.61) (-5.75) (-5.47) (-5.39)
Ln(Molage)t -0.224 -0.224 -0.220 -0.224 -0.230 -0.225
(-8.07) (-8.12) (-8.01) (-8.19) (-8.80) (-8.60)
Censormolt 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.014
(0.29) (0.29) (0.37) (0.28) (0.25) (0.34)
Censorlagt 0.175 0.176 0.162 0.176 0.181 0.168
(2.30) (2.30) (2.13) (2.31) (2.36) (2.19)
Ngenericst−1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.15) (0.18) (0.60) (0.04) (-0.47) (-0.03)
composite -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.027 -0.028 -0.029
(-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.91) (-0.95) (-0.96)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.659
(35.14) (35.24) (35.06) (35.10) (35.36) (35.17)
Dupricegt−1 -1.223 -1.223 -1.231 -1.223 -1.220 -1.230
(-15.75) (-15.74) (-15.83) (-15.73) (-15.62) (-15.74)
HHI-corrt−1 0.029 0.031 0.143 0.029 0.013 0.155
(0.43) (0.48) (2.14) (0.43) (0.21) (2.30)
Msharet−1 0.311 0.314 0.394 0.312 0.292 0.391
(4.30) (4.81) (6.32) (4.36) (4.71) (6.51)
Csharet−1 0.034 0.036 0.132 0.035 0.020 0.140
(0.51) (0.57) (2.02) (0.52) (0.32) (2.16)
AVMMCt−1 0.001 0.022 0.004 0.026
(0.19) (2.84) (0.84) (3.27)
AVMMCt−1*HHI-corrt−1 -0.038 -0.039
(-4.46) (-4.28)
Dregt*Ngenericst 0.001 0.002 0.003
(0.21) (0.78) (0.88)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1 -0.026 -0.005
(-1.86) (-0.34)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1*HHI-corrt−1 -0.068
(-3.73)
cons 0.444 0.437 0.335 0.441 0.502 0.372
(1.92) (1.93) (1.48) (1.95) (2.39) (1.75)
N 66891 66891 66891 66891 66891 66891
R2 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.607 0.608
F 566.29 534.83 563.53 570.90 522.15 507.85
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Table 11: Regression results for the pooled sample. Independent variable Log (Pricet).
Corporation fixed effects. Linear average multimarket contact control. Market definition:
Molecule. Country Dummies included (not shown)
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(Fsize)t−1 0.186 0.185 0.186 0.186 0.185 0.186
(20.12) (20.02) (20.14) (20.11) (19.72) (19.96)
Newt−1 -0.130 -0.127 -0.126 -0.130 -0.126 -0.125
(-5.76) (-5.51) (-5.47) (-5.75) (-5.41) (-5.38)
Ln(Molage)t -0.224 -0.218 -0.210 -0.224 -0.223 -0.213
(-8.07) (-7.81) (-7.43) (-8.19) (-8.26) (-7.90)
Censormolt 0.012 0.018 0.026 0.011 0.019 0.026
(0.29) (0.45) (0.62) (0.28) (0.47) (0.63)
Censorlagt 0.175 0.170 0.158 0.176 0.173 0.161
(2.30) (2.24) (2.09) (2.31) (2.26) (2.12)
Ngenericst−1 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.15) (0.23) (0.57) (0.04) (-0.51) (-0.40)
composite -0.027 -0.026 -0.026 -0.027 -0.028 -0.028
(-0.91) (-0.87) (-0.87) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.93)
Ln(Pricegt−1) 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.659
(35.14) (35.05) (34.96) (35.10) (35.08) (34.96)
Dupricegt−1 -1.223 -1.223 -1.233 -1.223 -1.220 -1.231
(-15.75) (-15.71) (-15.85) (-15.73) (-15.57) (-15.71)
HHI-corrt−1 0.029 0.044 0.171 0.029 0.034 0.167
(0.43) (0.67) (2.59) (0.43) (0.51) (2.59)
Msharet−1 0.311 0.341 0.436 0.312 0.328 0.429
(4.30) (4.89) (6.58) (4.36) (4.86) (6.81)
Csharet−1 0.034 0.052 0.161 0.035 0.042 0.157
(0.51) (0.79) (2.45) (0.52) (0.65) (2.47)
AVMMCt−1 0.010 0.036 0.014 0.043
(2.86) (4.65) (3.90) (5.12)
AVMMCt−1*HHI-corrt−1 -0.049 -0.053
(-4.37) (-4.17)
Dregt*Ngenericst 0.001 0.003 0.005
(0.21) (1.08) (1.50)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1 -0.025 -0.028
(-2.65) (-1.65)
Dregt*AVMMCt−1*HHI-corrt−1 0.005
(0.18)
cons 0.444 0.364 0.212 0.441 0.409 0.246
(1.92) (1.58) (0.90) (1.95) (1.86) (1.10)
N 66891 66891 66891 66891 66891 66891
R2 0.607 0.607 0.608 0.607 0.607 0.608
F 566.29 544.15 536.52 570.90 530.04 486.39
